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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CALL FOR A PRO INDIVIDUAL INTERPRETATION

VALERIO DE OLIVEIRA MAZZUOLI
DILTON RIBEIRO
In its traditional conception, international law regulates relations between sovereign states. This
definition is challenged by current developments of international law, especially in the area of
human rights. The human person is arguably a bearer of rights and duties under international
law. However, recognizing this individual legal personality is not enough. International bodies
and treaties need to acknowledge that individuals are subjects of international law within a
pluralistic world. In other words, the law of nations must crystalize the idea that individuals
are, with all their cultural differences, subjects of international law. The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights recognizes this view through its pro homine principle, which informs that
human rights instruments must seek the best possible protection for the human person. In this
interpretative framework, the Inter-American Court crystalized a body of norms protecting
indigenous rights and their cultural and historical backgrounds within the general protection
system of the American Convention. The extensive interpretation of rights articulates a new
view on the individual legal personality. Accordingly, this article seeks to understand this
approach based on key decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on indigenous
cases.

I.THE RECOGNITION OF MULTICULTURALISM is unquestionably one of the most

significant post-Second World War movements stemmed from the notion of individual
personality and human centrality. It is intrinsically linked to the conception of the human
person as a bearer of cultural characteristics that are indispensable to a full and useful existence
and that, consequently, must always be observed and respected. Political philosophy, especially
after the 1980s, made room for debate and the development of multiple conceptions of
multiculturalism. This debate, which soon later became a concern of law and for lawyers, was
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strongly rooted in a divergence between communitarians and liberals, and many questions and
different philosophical theories and perspectives still surround this discussion.1
In the area of public policy, this topic bears considerable importance. States and the
international community as a whole look to better accommodate national minorities and foreign
individuals. Yet, they face a modern world where technology facilitates immigration and with
territories that are occupied, peacefully or not, by peoples with diverse cultural characteristics.
These characteristics go beyond the territorial boundaries where these individuals reside and
include a mosaic of features, such as language, religion, philosophical views, and social
conditions that constitute an intrinsic part of these individuals. Accordingly, this reality
generates heated public debates that are part of states’ political agenda, especially after the
Second World War.2

1

. In political philosophy, the debate on multiculturalism, which relates to a body of ideas concerning legal
accommodation and policies of ethnic diversity, is strongly divided between the liberal and communitarian
approaches. Liberals essentially argue that individuals must be free to decide their own concept of good life and
not be constrained by any enforced or inherited condition. Conversely, communitarians affirm that every human
being is connected through roles in social relations. Kymlicka argues differently by asserting that debates
concerning individuals and groups reach a consensus on liberalism and democracy, but disagree on the
interpretation of these principles in multiethnic and multinational societies. For a general view on the concept of
multiculturalism, on the liberal and communitarian dichotomy, and on the characteristics or argument of
multiculturalism, see , Charles Taylor, “Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?”, (2012) 38 Philosophy & Social
Criticism 413; John Arthur, “Multi-culturalism” in Hugh Lafollette, ed, The Oxford Handbook Of Practical Ethics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism (Harvard: Harvard
University Press, 2000); Michael Murphy, Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction (Abingdon/ US/Canada :
Routledge, 2012); Interview by Verena Risse and Martin Vezér with Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism in Theory
and Practice”, (2008)1 Rerum Causae 3 at 62; Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, And The Future
(Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012); Duncan Ivinson, ed, The Ashgate Research Companion To
Multiculturalism (England/USA : Ashgate Publishing Limited/ Company , 2010); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory Of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Jeremy Waldron,
“Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative”, (1992) 25 U MICH J L Reform 751; Michael McDonald,
“Liberalism, Community, and Culture”, (1992) 42 U TORONTO L J 113; Will Kymlicka, “The Rights of Minority
Cultures: Reply to Kukathas”, (1992) 20 Political Theory 140; Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Rights Again: A
Rejoinder to Kymlicka”, (1992) 20 Political Theory 674; and Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the
Politics of Recognition (1994).
2
. Ideas about the accommodation of minorities in multiethnic, multinational states have been part of policies for
more than forty years. For a general view on the debate on multiculturalism and human rights or public policy,
see Michael Kenny, The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the Dilemmas of Difference (United
States: Polity Press, 2004); Sarah Song, Justice, Gender And The Politics Of Multiculturalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Will Kymlicka, La Política Vernácula: Nacionalismo, Multiculturalimo Y
Cidadania [Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship] (Barcelona: Paidos Iberica
Ediciones S a, 2003) 30 [Kymlicka, La Política]; Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity
in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) 59-67 [Benhabib, The Claims of Culture];
Courtney Jung, “Democratic Engagement with Ethnic Minority Claims: A Methodological Intervention into a
Normative Debate” in Omid Payrow Shabani ed, Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (University of
Wales Press, 2007) 263-79; Melissa Williams, “Justice Towards Groups: Political not Juridical”, (1995) 23

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Due to its practical, political, legal and philosophical relevance, multiculturalism is in
a central stage in many different areas of study, such as education, philosophy and political
science. Furthermore, it is a key aspect in debates concerning minorities, foreign population,
immigration and diversity in general.3 But paradoxically, multiculturalism is not a central
aspect of the literature of public international law, especially in the area of international human
rights. This does not mean that international courts do not seriously discuss the accommodation
of foreign population and the respect of minority rights, such as indigenous rights. This also
does not mean that human rights scholars have not written on the importance to legally uphold
cultural diversity and the recognition of the human person as a central aspect of international
human rights law.4
There is, however, a lack of writing on how international human rights courts
accommodate minorities. More specifically, there is no or limited literature on how the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the principal judicial human rights body of the Organization
of American States, accommodates minorities within the scope of the American Convention,
the Court’s main treaty that almost exclusively establishes civil and political rights.5 This lack
of existing literature weakens the legal debate and impedes an effective argument in favor of

Political Theory 75 and Michael Murphy, “The Limits of Culture in the Politics of Self-Determination”, (2001)1
Ethnicities 367.
3
. See supra note 2. See also Jeff Spinner-Halev, Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship (USA:
John Hopkins University Press, 2000); Anne Philips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995); Kwame A. Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds, Color Conscious: the Political Morality of Race (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998); Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, After Multiculturalism (United Kingdom: Foreign
Policy Centre, 2000); Vernon Van Dyke, “The Individual, the State, and the Ethnic Communities in Political
Theory”, (1977) 29 World Politics 343; and Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford
University Press,1989) [Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community].
4
. See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway “Reflections on Multiculturalism and International Law” in Sienho Yee & JacquesYvan Morin eds, Multiculturalism and International Law Essays in Honor of Edward McWhinney
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 166. As Mariko pointed out, international courts such as the
International Court of Justice currently face a wide range of disputes reflecting different cultural backgrounds,
which require solid and well-founded court decisions addressing such multicultural diversities. See Mariko
Kawano, “The Administration of Justice by the International court of Justice and the Parties” in Sienho Yee &
Jacques-Yvan Morin eds, Multiculturalism and International Law: Essays in Honor of Edward McWhinney
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 300.
5
. The American Convention on Human Rights has one general provision on economic, social and cultural rights.
See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 26, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
Nº 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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recognizing minority and vulnerable groups’ rights, which could ground future decisions of
domestic and international courts. Consequently, academic writings could work as subsidiary
references that help judges accommodate individuals’ rights within the international legal
system.6
This article thus seeks to understand the approach of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and how judges, by applying an extensive interpretation of its treaty, further
recognized the individual legal personality under international law. The article also seeks to
review how judges crystalized the view that individuals not only are bearers of rights and
duties, but can also have different cultural and historical backgrounds from one another, which
requires international courts to acknowledge this idea when interpreting and applying treaties.
This reasoning, the pro homine principle, is the key pillar in truly recognizing the human person
as a subject of international law.

II. THE INTER-AMERICAN
MULTICULTURAL WORLD

SYSTEM

OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN

A

International law traditionally refers to a group of norms and principles created by states in
order to regulate their relations with one another.7 However, this traditional approach has met
some practical and theoretical problems, especially in international human rights law. This
article argues that human rights, as a particular system that is part of the broader realm of
international law, differs from the latter in one central aspect: it recognizes the human person
as a central element and acknowledges its international personality. This particularity forces
judges and the international community as a whole to consider the interests and rights of
individuals when interpreting and applying human rights norms. In accepting individuals as

6

. United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, annex to the Charter of United Nations, art. 38,
Jun. 26, 1945, Can. T.S. Nº 7.
7
. See J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1963) 1. See also L. Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise (Peace) (London/New York:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1912) 3.

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

bearers of rights and duties distinct from those of states, the international sphere not only
recognizes the individual’s legal personality at the international level, but also acknowledges
more extensively that all the particularities of the “human family” 8 need to be important
elements in the evolution and application of international law of human rights. The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights9 seeks to recognize this multiculturalist and pluralist
approach through the pro homine or pro individual interpretation. Accordingly, there is an
intrinsic connection between the individual legal personality and an interpretation of human
rights treaties that takes into consideration the wide variety of cultures of its individual subjects.
States, as the traditional subjects of the law of nations, occupy a dominant position
among the actors on the international level. Notwithstanding states’ dominant position, human
rights instruments arguably confer rights and interests to individuals and change the
hermeneutics of international law in order to accommodate the human person and acknowledge
her status as the weak link in a state/individual dichotomy.10
International human rights law instruments arguably seek to reconcile natural law
concepts with legal positivism: they attempt to acknowledge in treaties and declarations the
centrality of the individual in human rights. The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of
Man, following the precepts of legal positivism, acknowledges in its preamble the importance
of domestic legislation and the necessity for more cooperation between the American states to
protect human rights.11 At the same time, this regional declaration takes a natural law

8

. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948),
preamble (Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
9
. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, Chapter VIII.
10
. Valerio Mazzuoli, Curso de Direito Internacional Público (Textbook on Public International Law) (2013), 43334, 451-53.
11
. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, preamble, O.A.S.
Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17
(1992) ( American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man) (stating that the “affirmation of essential human
rights by the American States together with the guarantees given by the internal regimes of the states establish the
initial system of protection considered by the American States as being suited to the present social and juridical
conditions, not without a recognition on their part that they should increasingly strengthen that system in the
international field as conditions become more favorable ….”).
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perspective by acknowledging that states recognize that “the essential rights of man are not
derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of his
human personality.”12 This is a shift from the predominant positivist view that rights only stem
from state agreements. Accordingly, members of the Organization of American States codify
through the Declaration that states do not simply grant, but rather recognize, international
human rights. This acknowledgement is based on the idea that human rights stem from the
individual legal personality.13
As a human rights declaration, the American Declaration was not initially envisaged to
be a legally binding instrument. However, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights faced
the question of whether this declaration had normative force when Colombia requested an
advisory opinion on this issue.14 The Court found that to determine the legal status of the
American Declaration, it is necessary to examine the evolution that the Inter-American System
has undergone since the adoption of this regional instrument.15 The Court set out its basic
argument that:
[T]o determine the legal status of the American Declaration it is appropriate to look to the
inter-American system of today in the light of the evolution it has undergone since the
adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the normative value and significance
which that instrument was believed to have had in 1948. … The evolution of the here
relevant “inter-American law” mirrors on the regional level the developments in
contemporary international law and especially in human rights law, which distinguished
that law from classical international law to a significant extent.16

In this advisory opinion, the Inter-American Court pointed out that the regional
development of international law, especially of human rights, differs from the classical view

12

. Ibid.
. For a discussion on this non-positivistic approach based on individual legal personality, see Antonio Augusto
Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 213-273; Hersch
Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (London : Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950) 27-60, 69-72 and
111-113.
14
. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article
64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
10, para 2 (July 14, 1989) (Interpretation of the American Declaration).
15
. Ibid at para 37.
16
. Ibid at paras 37-38 (emphasis added).
13
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of international law. Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the basis of this difference,
the recent evolution of international human rights law – especially after the Second World
War17 – and the nature of the American Declaration, which combines natural law and legal
positivism, suggest that a significant change in contemporary international human rights law is
precisely the codification of the individual legal personality and its centrality in the legal
system. This view departs from the “classical” international law system grounded in the
Westphalian paradigm, which placed complete power into the hands of states as the only
subjects of international law.18 In other words, the main aspect of international human rights
law is the protection of individuals as bearers of rights and duties and not the protection of
mutual state interests.
Thus, this regional instrument was created as a list of fundamental interests of
individuals that flow from their legal personality and that the American states should take into
consideration on the international and domestic levels. These “interests” could later become
legally binding norms if domestic legislation or international treaties codified them. Moreover,
this Declaration became even more important as these “interests,” or “soft” rights and duties,
changed status and acquired a normative character.19 This normativity can be divided into
broad and specific. Rights crystallized in the American Declaration acquired specific
normative status either by way of custom or general principles of law, or due to the
interpretation of the Charter of American States.20 Furthermore, the American Declaration
acquired broad normative status because it recognizes that individuals have interests at the

. With the creation of the United Nations, the “international bill of rights” and the regional human rights treaties
established a human rights system part of general international law, which seeks to protect individuals. See John
P. Humphrey, “The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation”, (1976)17 Wm &Mary L Rev
527; see also Thomas Buergenthal, “International Human Rights Law and Institutions: Accomplishments and
Prospects”, (1988) 63 Wash L Rev 1.
18
. For a Westphalian view of international law see Oppenheim, supra note 7 at 362-369.
19
. Thomas Buergenthal et al, International Human Rights in a Nutshell 4th edn, (United States: Thomson Reuters,
2009) 262-263.
20
. Malcolm Shaw, International Law 5th edn, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 260 (arguing, in
the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that a non-binding declaration may come to acquire
normative force in these ways).
17
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international level, that is, they have rights and duties under international law that need the
international community’s consideration.
In considering whether the American Declaration possessed normative force, the InterAmerican Court stated that the OAS Charter refers to fundamental rights in its preamble and a
number of provisions, but the Court did not list or define them.21 Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights22 protects rights
“enunciated and defined in the American Declaration”23 based on Article 1 of the InterAmerican Commission’s Statute.24 Moreover, it acknowledged that the OAS General
Assembly has “repeatedly recognized that the American Declaration is a source of
international obligations for the member States of the OAS.”25
Based on these arguments, the Inter-American Court held that “the member states of
the Organization have signaled their agreement that the Declaration contains and defines the
fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter.”26 The Court thus unanimously decided
that although the Declaration is not a treaty, and the American Convention remains the first
source of obligations to its members:27
For the member States of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines the human
rights referred to in the Charter. Moreover, Articles 1(2) (b) and 20 of the Commission’s
Statute define the competence of that body with respect to the human rights enunciated in
the Declaration, with the result that to this extent the American Declaration is for these
States a source of international obligations related to the Charter of the Organization.28

Accordingly, the Inter-American Court recognized that international human rights law
needed to be interpreted in light of subsequent developments, without necessarily referencing
21

. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 39.
. Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States arts. 112, 150, Apr. 30, 1948,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter].
23
. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 41.
24
. Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 1. Res. 447
adopted by the General Assembly at its 9th Regular Session, La Paz, Bolivia (Oct. 1979), reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 133
(1992).
25
. Interpretation of the American Declaration, supra note 14 at para 42.
26
. Ibid at para 43.
27
. Ibid at paras 46-47.
28
. Ibid at para 45.
22
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to the authors of an international instrument. Based on this theoretical foundation, the Court
acknowledged the binding status of the American Declaration as the authoritative definition of
the expression “human rights” in the OAS Charter. The Court thus recognized the normative
status of the American Declaration based on reasoning similar to that commonly accepted for
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is generally considered to hold the
authoritative interpretation and definition of the references to human rights and fundamental
freedoms contained in the Charter of the United Nations.29 However, the Court did not
elaborate on the differences between human rights declarations with normative force and
human rights treaties.
As previously explained, human rights declarations can have a broad or specific
normativity. Specific normativity occurs when a right enshrined in the declaration becomes a
general principle of law or a customary norm of international law. The normativity is broad
when the instrument expresses the intrinsic elements of human rights: it establishes rights,
rights holders and duty bearers. The broad or general normativity of declarations is not the
same as that of treaties. In declarations, the right establishes that individuals are, generally
speaking, right holders and addressees of rights, while states have the duty to acknowledge
these individuals’ status.
In general terms, human rights have three intrinsic elements: a right, a right holder and
a right to a claim. When “A has a right to x with respect to B,” one can point out the existence
of a right holder (A) and a duty bearer (B). Consequently, A’s entitlement to x in relation to B
indicates that B has a correlative obligation to A, and thus, A can make “special claims upon B

. See Humphrey, supra note 17 at 529 (stating that the Universal Declaration “provides the framework for the
international recognition of those human rights and fundamental freedoms that were left undefined by the
Charter”); Shaw, supra note 20 at 260 (discussing the influence and significance of the Universal Declaration,
including as an interpretation of the UN Charter); Buergenthal, supra note 19 at 41–46 (discussing different bases
for the Universal Declaration’s binding force); Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, “The Interdependence of All
Human Rights – Obstacles and Challenges to Their Implementation”, (1998) 50 INT’L J SOC SCI 513 at 513
(Cançado Trindade, Interdependence) (stating that “the Universal Declaration is widely recognized today as an
authoritative interpretation of human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter.”).
29
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to discharge these obligations.”30 Thus, a right holder, that is, an individual, has a human right
against states, quasi-state entities or even against other individuals. If this right is breached, the
right holder possesses a right of claim against the violator of his fundamental right.
Accordingly, the sentence “A has a right to x with respect to B” captures the basic intrinsic
elements of human rights: right holders, claims, and duty bearers.
In international law, this philosophical theory of human rights encompassing the
existence of right holders, claims, and duty bearers applies to human rights treaties. Unlike
treaties, declarations do not establish specific binding obligations but only propositions that
states must follow when conducting their domestic and international affairs. However, they can
crystalize general normative obligations, especially through the codification of customary
international law, that grant the obligations mandatory force. In certain cases they can even
acquire jus cogens status.31 However, the American Declaration was not envisaged as an
instrument crystalizing specific obligations whereby a breach of right can lead to a claim
against the party that violated the right holder’s fundamental right. Nonetheless, the
Declaration establishes a general normativity, that is, the view that individuals possess a
general right to be right holders of human rights and states have the duty to acknowledge this
characteristic as part of the international human rights system. The American Declaration
upholds that individuals are the bearers of rights and duties at the international level and have
interests different from those of states. Furthermore, states have the duty to acknowledge this
status.

30

. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989),
ch 10 and 11.
31
. On the force of customary norms to grant normativity to declarations, see Comm. on Human Rights, Rep. on
the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the Commission, Mr.
Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, para 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/23 (Jan. 28, 1987); Shaw, supra note 20 at 260. Hannum
affirms that the Universal Declaration, for example, has acquired jus cogens status. See Hurst Hannum, “The
Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law”, (1996) 25 Ga J Int’l &
Comp L 287, 326.
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The American Declaration thus sets the parameters of a human-centered or a pro
homine interpretation of international law. The regional instruments of human rights of the
Organization of American States must be interpreted and applied taking into consideration that
individuals are the bearers of rights and duties at the international level and have interests of
their own without the tutelage of states. The American Convention on Human Rights
supplemented this reasoning by specifying the rights and claims of individuals. This crystalized
an effective dichotomous relation between states and individuals, whereby the violation of a
right can lead to a right to claim before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights32
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.33 Moreover, regarding the interpretation of the
Convention, Article 29 precluded restrictive interpretation of rights and consequently set in
motion the extensive interpretative approach of the Inter-American Court.34
This position diverges from the classical view of international law centered on the
interests of states.35 As the Inter-American Court pointed out in its advisory opinion on the
Interpretation of the American Declaration, international human rights differs from classical
international law to a significant extent. The main divergence concerns the centrality of
individual humans in international human rights, as reflected through the pro individual or pro
homine system in the American Declaration. Article 29 of the American Convention further
develops this premise in the scope of legal interpretation. In a pro homine system, rights
recognized in human rights instruments flow from the human person and therefore cannot be

32

. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, ch VII.
. Ibid, ch 8.
34
. Article 29 spells out that “[n]o provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State
Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this
Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or
exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another
convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in
the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d. excluding or
limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of
the same nature may have.” Ibid, art 29.
35
. See Oppenheim, supra note 7.
33
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limited by states “to a greater extent than is provided for” in the instrument itself.36
Accordingly, judges must apply the American Convention based on a pro individual system
with the possibility of extensive application of rights.
States themselves designed an inter-American human rights system grounded on the
human person as a subject of rights and duties stemming from their legal personality. Thus,
international human rights law is based on an individual-centered or pro homine system. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights extensively discussed and applied this notion of an
individual-centered or pro individual interpretation arguably because of two main practical
considerations. First, international human rights law concerns the well being of the human
person either on the individual or collective level. Second, the American continent comprises
a diverse group of individuals with different social, political, historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds, all of them equally entitled to international protection.
Accordingly, the pro homine system accommodates the diversity of the American
continent based on an extensive application of rights focusing on and flowing from the human
person. The Inter-American Court is often called to settle disputes that require an extensive,
individual-centric interpretation. Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez asserted that:
When exercising its contentious jurisdiction, the Inter-American Court is duty-bound to
observe the provisions of the American Convention, to interpret them in accordance with
the rules that the Convention itself sets forth . . . . It must also heed the principle of
interpretation that requires that the object and purpose of the treaties be considered (article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention), referenced below, and the principle pro homine of the
international law of human rights - frequently cited in this Court's case-law - which requires
the interpretation that is conducive to the fullest protection of persons, all for the ultimate
purpose of preserving human dignity, ensuring fundamental rights and encouraging their
advancement.37

36

. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 29 (a).
. Sergio Garcia Ramirez, “Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez in the Judgment on the Merits
and Reparations in the “Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case,” (2002) 19 Ariz J Int’L & Comp L 449
(emphasis added).
37
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Following this line of thought, Henderson also asserts that the pro homine framework,
which he calls “principle,” is a logical element of international human rights law. 38 He argues
that international human rights norms must always be in favor of individuals: the hermeneutical
criterion informing that the interpretation of protected rights must always be extensive is an
essential part of international human rights law.39 This is the position of the Inter-American
Court itself. For instance, the Court stated that it could compare the American Convention with
other international instruments in order “to stress certain aspects concerning the manner in
which a certain right has been formulated.”40 Moreover, the Court found that this approach to
legal interpretation cannot be used restrictively to limit rights enshrined in the Convention.41
Consequently, grounding its view on Article 29 of the American Convention that forbids
restrictive interpretation, the Court held that:
[I]f in the same situation both the American Convention and another international treaty are
applicable, the rule most favorable to the individual must prevail. Considering that the
Convention itself establishes that its provisions should not have a restrictive effect on the
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed in other international instruments, it makes even less
sense to invoke restrictions contained in those other international instruments, but which are
not found in the Convention, to limit the exercise of the rights and freedoms that the latter
recognizes.42

This approach intends to advance human protection beyond the initial set of rights
spelled out by the American Convention in order to meet social needs and aspirations. The
approach also seeks to better protect human dignity by taking into account natural law and legal
positivism, two parts of a system that recognizes the individual legal personality in a pluralistic
world. By adopting an expansive interpretation in favor of individuals, the Inter-American
Court is thus able to refer to different human rights instruments and render decisions that extend

. Humberto Henderson, “Los Tratados Internacionales de Derechos Humanos en el Orden Interna: La
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beyond the traditional scope of the American Convention and that pertain to other areas of
international law, such as international humanitarian law, environmental law and indigenous
rights.43
III. The Application of a Multicultural and Individual-Centered Interpretation by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Based on Article 29 of the American Convention, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,44 and the human-centralization of human rights, the Inter-American Court, can
constantly refer to different treaties or instruments in general in order to render decisions that
escape the traditional scope of the provisions of the American Convention.45 However, the
American Convention contains no specific provision enshrining indigenous rights. The Court
has advanced the protection of indigenous rights in a series of cases by applying this proindividual principle that recognizes individual beings as international legal subjects endowed
with diverse cultural backgrounds.
Indeed, the application of this pro homine approach has substantially increased the
protection of indigenous rights in the American continent.46 For instance, the notion of
communal lands is vital for the protection of indigenous rights.47 In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court protected this notion by holding
that Nicaragua had neither demarcated the communal lands of the Awas Tingni Community,

. Lucas Lixinski, “Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the
Service of the Unity of International Law” (2010) 21 Eur J Int’L L585 at 603.
44
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. Lixinski, supra note 43 at 603.
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Human Rights and Venezuela denounced the American Convention. See I/A Court History, The Inter-American
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nor adopted effective measures to ensure the Community’s property rights to its ancestral lands
and natural resources.48 The Inter-American Court stated that indigenous peoples’ customary
law must be especially taken under consideration.49 It concluded that due to customary
practices, land possession “should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to
property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property, and for consequent
registration.”50 Based on the teleological pro homine principle enshrined in Article 29 of the
American Convention, the Inter-American Court extensively interpreted the application of the
right to property enshrined in this regional treaty51 to cover the protection of communal
property and the recognition of indigenous communities’ close ties with the land. The
protection of communal lands flows from the pro homine interpretation, which on its turn is
possible due to a mix of positivism – state agreement – with the natural law view that rights
and duties stem from the human personality and not solely from state creation.
The Court used this individual-based approach to decide that the right to property
enshrined in Article 21 also includes the rights of members of the indigenous communities to
communal property.52 The Court reached this decision taking into account that indigenous
peoples have a communitarian tradition, in which land ownership is not focused on an
individual person but on the group and its community.53 This connection to the land, according
to the Court, is material and spiritual in a way that it is part of “the fundamental basis of their
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cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.”54 Although there is no
explicit provision regulating the relationship of indigenous communities with their land, the
Court adopted a pro individual interpretation of the American Convention and decided that
Nicaragua must adopt the measures necessary to establish “an effective mechanism for
delimitation, demarcation and titling of the property of indigenous communities, in accordance
with their customary law, values [and] customs.”55
The Court confirmed the right to communal property as a group right – which embodies
the right of claim and natural resources – in subsequent cases. The following paradigmatic case
was Yakye Indigenous Community v. Paraguay in which the Court applied an extensive
interpretation of Article 21 of the American Convention with the aid of exogenous legal
instruments.56 In this case, the Inter-American Commission affirmed that Paraguay did not
adequately ensure the enjoyment of the ancestral property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community and that this situation made it impossible for the Community to own and possess
its territory, placing the Community in a vulnerable situation in terms of food, medical and
public health care.57 In light of the particularities of the case, Paraguay asserted that its
“[d]omestic legislation does not encompass a means to acquire the right to property based on a
historical right.”58 Furthermore, Paraguay added that “while there is a generic recognition of
the traditional ownership right of indigenous peoples to their land[,] [for them to enjoy the right
to such property,] it is necessary for them to actually possess it and live as a community on that
land.”59
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In response, the Inter-American Court applied a pro individual interpretation. It
mentioned Article 14(3) of ILO Convention No. 169,60 incorporated into Paraguayan domestic
legislation by Law No. 234/93, which spells out that “[a]dequate procedures shall be
established within the national legal system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.”61
The Court used this provision to extend the scope of the American Convention: it reasoned that
Article 14 of the ILO Convention, in combination with Articles 8 and 25 of the American
Convention, obligated Paraguay to provide effective means of making such claims – with due
process guarantees – to the members of the indigenous communities, as part of their right to
communal property.62
Again, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights analyzed the American Convention
and acknowledged that indigenous communities have a special relation, which states must
respect and effectively protect, to acknowledge the right of claim to communal lands.63 The
Inter-American Court, mentioning the European Court of Human Rights, held that human
rights treaties are living instruments, and that their interpretation must go hand in hand with
the evolution of international law and current living conditions.64 This evolutionary
interpretation is consistent with the general rules of interpretation embodied in Article 29 of
the American Convention,65 as well as those set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.66 In other words, in adopting its pro-individual approach, the Inter-American Court
expressly acknowledges that treaty interpretation should take into account instruments directly
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related to it (paragraph two of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention) and the system of which it
is a part (paragraph three of Article 31 of said Convention)67.
The Court thus takes the position that “in its analysis of the scope of Article 21 of the
Convention, mentioned above, the Court deems it useful and appropriate to resort to other
international treaties, aside from the American Convention, such as ILO Convention No. 169,
to interpret its provisions in accordance with the evolution of the inter-American system, taking
into account related developments in International Human Rights Law.”68 By referring to the
need to interpret and apply the American Convention in the context of evolving human rights
in contemporary international law, the Court argued that the indigenous provisions of the ILO
Convention No. 169 could “shed light on the content and scope of Article 21 of the American
Convention.”69 Applying this criterion, the Court found that “the close relationship of
indigenous peoples with the land must be acknowledged and understood as the fundamental
basis for their culture, spiritual life, wholeness, economic survival, and preservation and
transmission to future generations.”70
The Court also mentioned Article 13 of ILO Convention No. 169, which establishes that
states must respect “the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples
concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they
occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.”71
Consequently, the Court concluded that Article 21 of the American Convention safeguards the
close ties of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands and the natural resources associated
with the indigenous culture, including the components derived from them.72
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Ultimately, the Inter-American Court recognized that there is a dual right embodied in
Article 21. First, there is the traditional (more Western) view of the right to private property.
Second, this Article comprises the right of indigenous communities to their territory and natural
resources in accordance with their indigenous culture, customs and spiritual life. These two
views, however, are interpreted as not being in conflict with another. As the Inter-American
Court pointed out, this teleological interpretation of the American Convention does not entail
that every time a conflict emerges between the territorial interests of private individuals (or of
a state) and those of indigenous communities, the latter necessarily prevail over the former. 73
Nevertheless, when states are justifiably unable to adopt measures to return the traditional
territory and communal resources to indigenous communities, the state must not only grant
compensation based on a discretionary criteria, but there must be a consensus with the
indigenous peoples involved, in accordance with the peoples’ own mechanisms of consultation,
values, customs and customary laws.74 This reasoning uses a pro homine or pro individual
interpretation of the American Convention assisted by Convention No. 169 of the ILO, and
takes into consideration the existence of a pluralistic world comprising of different peoples
with different cultures, backgrounds and views.75
Analyzing whether Paraguay breached the American Convention’s Article 4,76 which
grants people the right to life, the Inter-American Court sought to apply an extensive pro
individual interpretation. It referred to views of the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, in General Comment 14 on the right to enjoy the highest attainable
standard of health,77 to decide that indigenous peoples can be placed in a situation of
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vulnerability if access to their ancestral lands, and consequently, access to food and clean water,
are at stake.78 Based on a pro individual interpretation of the American Convention, the Court
established that the state concerned breached Article 4(1) and Article 1(1) to the detriment of
the Yakye Axa Community.79 Among other orders, the Court decided that Paraguay must take
the necessary steps to guarantee the property rights of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community
and must publicly acknowledge its responsibility.80
Similarly, in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Court followed
the pro homine approach established in previous cases and advanced the understanding that
communal property is attached to the indigenous community’s worldview and cultural identity
as subjects of law.81 In this case, the Inter-American Commission filed a complaint that
Paraguay did not ensure the ancestral property rights of the Sawhoyamaxa Community and its
members.82 The Inter-American Court applied an extensive pro individual interpretation of the
case by analyzing the content and scope of Article 21 along with Convention No. 169 of the
ILO, and this was appropriate since Paraguay had previously ratified the ILO Convention and
incorporated its provisions into domestic legislation.83 The Inter-American Court followed the
precedent set by previous cases on the evolutionary individual-centered legal reasoning
extending the scope of Article 21 of the American Convention in the light of exogenous
treaties.84 Based on this interpretation, the Court decided that the close ties indigenous
communities have to their traditional lands, including their natural resources and incorporeal
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elements, “must be secured” under the American Convention.85 The Court added that this close
relation with their traditional lands and natural resources exists not only because the resources
are the Community’s main means of survival, but also because they “form part of [the
Community’s] worldview, of their religiousness, and consequently, of their cultural identity.”86
The Inter-American Court hence affirmed that it must interpret and apply international
human rights law while considering the “evolution of the Inter-American system.” The Court
did not define nor give the general characteristics of this evolution, but as its body of case law
suggests, this system encompasses an amalgamation of both a natural law approach and legal
positivism within a pro individual framework. In other words, individuals are subjects of
international law and have interests that the Inter-American human rights bodies need to take
into account. These interests do not form a unified group of rights and duties granted to
individuals as the American continent includes a diverse group of individuals with different
cultural, political and historical backgrounds, and the Inter-American Court needs to
acknowledge this pluralistic system. This general rule is crystallized by the preambles and
normative characters of the human rights instruments of the inter-American system as a whole
and, specifically, by Article 29 of the American Convention.87
In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Court held that indigenous communities have the
right of participation in the exploration of natural resources as part of the communal right to
property.88 Again, analyzing questions out of scope of the literal meaning of the Convention,
the Court extended the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions favoring the human person
with the aid of previous cases and external legal instruments and reference to other tribunals.
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In this case, the Inter-American Court adopted a similar tone as in other cases and affirmed that
Suriname failed to recognize the Saramaka People’s right to use and enjoy their territory; that
the State allegedly violated the right to judicial protection by failing to provide an effective
access to justice, particularly the right to property in accordance with communal traditions; and
that Suriname allegedly failed to adopt the necessary domestic provisions to provide such rights
to the Saramakas.89 To reach these conclusions, the Inter-American Court analyzed possible
restrictions on the right to property regarding concessions for the exploration and extraction of
certain natural resources, and informed that Suriname needed to follow three safeguards in
order to protect indigenous rights.90 First, states need to guarantee an effective participation of
the members of the indigenous community, in conformity with their customs and traditions.
Secondly, states need to ensure the indigenous community’s right to receive a reasonable
benefit from the exploration and extraction of natural resources within their territory. Finally,
independent and technically capable entities, with the state’s supervision, must perform a prior
environmental and social impact assessment of the indigenous community’s territory.91
To find that Suriname had indeed breached Article 21 of the American Convention,92
the Court mentioned foreign instruments and decisions/views. Referring to the Human Rights
Committee’s views in Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, the Court decided that the right
to culture of an indigenous community under Article 27 of the ICCPR could be restricted if
that community had been able to partake in the decision to restrict such right.93 Moreover, the
Court mentioned Article 32 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which was approved by the UN General Assembly with the support of Suriname.94
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Accordingly, the Inter-American Court acknowledged the necessity to “ensure an
effective participation of members of the Saramaka people in development or investment plans
within their territory.”95 Moreover, the Court mentioned the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people reaching a similar
decision by affirming that “[f]ree, prior and informed consent is essential for the [protection
of] human rights of indigenous peoples in relation to major development projects.”96
Furthermore, the Inter-American Court, besides referring to Article 15(2) of the ILO
Convention No. 169, informed that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
has stressed the necessity of prior informed consent of indigenous communities when major
exploitation activities are planned in their territories and “that the equitable sharing of benefits
to be derived from such exploitation be ensured.”97 Thus, the Court concluded that Suriname
breached, to the detriment of the members of the Saramaka people, the right to property
crystalized in Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights and the right to judicial
protection under Article 25.98
In the case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court dealt with displaced
indigenous communities, the protection of refugees within the scope of indigenous rights and
the special relation that indigenous groups have with the dead in the light of the cultural and
spiritual particularities.99 Again, seeking to ensure an effective protection of indigenous rights
even without explicit treaty provisions, the Court applies the pro homine principle to interpret
its Convention in the light of previous cases, exogenous treaties, and decisions/views from
other tribunals and bodies. In this case, the Inter-American Commission found that members
of the Surinamese armed forces attacked the N’djuka Maroon village of Moiwana and
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murdered over 40 men, women and children, and destroyed their village.100 Moreover, those
who were able to escape the attack allegedly fled into exile or internal displacement. 101 The
Commission pointed out that there was no adequate investigation of the situation, nobody was
prosecuted or punished and the survivors remained displaced from their lands.102 Consequently,
the indigenous peoples were allegedly “unable to return to their lands and to their traditional
way of life.”103 The Commission thus argued that although the attack itself occurred before
Suriname's ratification of the American Convention and its recognition of the Court's
jurisdiction, the denial of justice and the displacement of the Moiwana community fall under
the subject to the Court's jurisdiction.104
The Inter-American Court reminded that Suriname’s duties to investigate, prosecute
and punish the responsible individuals are not restricted to the calendar year of 1986.
Accordingly, the Court can assess Suriname’s obligations from the date when it recognized the
Court’s competence.105 Moreover, it acknowledged the lack of effort from Suriname to provide
effective remedies and its disregard for the communities' traditions. The Court pointed out that
the long-standing lack of effective remedies is normally a source of suffering and anguish for
victims and their family members.106 Moreover, the Court found that:
[T]he ongoing impunity has a particularly severe impact upon the Moiwana villagers, as a
N’djuka people. As indicated in the proven facts (supra paragraph 86(10)), justice and
collective responsibility are central precepts within traditional N’djuka society. If a
community member is wronged, the next of kin – which includes all members of his or her
matrilineage – are obligated to avenge the offense committed. If that relative has been killed,
the N’djuka believe that his or her spirit will not be able to rest until justice has been
accomplished. While the offense goes unpunished, the affronted spirit – and perhaps other
ancestral spirits – may torment their living next of kin.107
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The Court found that due to the impunity of the 1986 attack, community members were
deeply concerned that they could once again face grave hostilities if they were to return to their
traditional lands.108 Furthermore, they were unaware of what has happened to the remains of
their loved ones,109 a cause of great suffering since it is deeply important under their tradition
to possess “the physical remains of the deceased, as the corpse must be treated in a particular
manner during the N’djuka death ceremonies and must be placed in the burial ground of the
appropriate descent group.”110 Moreover, the abandonment of the Moiwana community’s
traditional lands disrupted the especial relationship they have with their ancestral territory.111
Taking into account these facts, the Court affirmed that Suriname breached Article 5 of the
American Convention.112 Evaluating whether Suriname breached Article 22 of the American
Convention, the Court referred to the UN Human Rights Committee:
[T]he Tribunal shares the views of the United Nations Human Rights Committee as set out
in its General Comment nº 27, which States that the right to freedom of movement and
residence consists, inter alia, in the following: a) the right of all those lawfully within a
State to move freely in that State, and to choose his or her place of residence; and b) the
right of a person to enter his or her country and the right to remain in one’s country. In
addition, the enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose
or reason for the person wanting to move or to stay in a place.113

In order to extend the scope of Article 22(1) of the American Convention114 to account
for the situation of refugees and displaced individuals, the Court mentioned the guiding
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principles of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced
Persons.115 As for the question of Article 22 of the Convention, the Court referred again to the
UN Human Rights Committee and cited the case of a Colombian civil rights attorney who,
after receiving death threats and suffering an attempt against his life, was forced into exile in
the United Kingdom, which, according to the Committee, breached his right of movement and
residence.116 Accordingly, the Inter-American Court concluded that Suriname breached Article
22(1) of the American Convention by failing to establish conditions and “provide the means
that would allow the Moiwana community members to return voluntarily, in safety and with
dignity, to their traditional lands.”117
Furthermore, the Court asserted that although the Moiwana community members are
not indigenous to the region,118 they “lived in the area in strict adherence to N’djuka custom
and they are inextricably tied to these lands and the sacred sites.”119 In the light of these
considerations, the Court concluded that Suriname breached Article 21 of the American
Convention.120 Moreover, the Court sustained that Suriname’s “manifest inactivity” clearly
failed to follow the principle of due diligence.121 It affirmed that it shares the same view of the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, which pointed out the lack of effective remedies
. The Tribunal stresses the following principles: “1(1). Internally displaced persons shall enjoy, in full equality,
the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country. They shall
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available for victims of human rights violations in Suriname.122 The Court thus held the State
breached Articles 8 (right to a fair trial)123 and 25 (right to judicial protection)124 of the
American Convention.125
In this case, the Inter-American Court thus followed previous decisions and
strengthened the protection of human rights in four different areas. First, following the
reasoning of previous cases, it acknowledged the status of individuals – including indigenous
peoples – as subjects of international law. Second, the Court recognized that the individual
legal personality includes an interpretation that takes into account the fact that the world
comprises different individuals with diverse cultural, historical and religious backgrounds.
Third, the Court broadened the scope of the American Convention to cover situations
specifically affecting indigenous communities by referring to previous judgments and other
human rights instruments or global instruments of protection. Fourth, the Court kept the
tradition of advancing the reparations system of the American Convention by adding to the
mere recognition of three kinds of rights (civil and political; economic, social and cultural; and
environmental and collective rights) the other rights of access to international justice and the
right of memory.126
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The Court ordered Suriname to issue an apology to its citizens and, moreover, to build
a monument in the name of those who lost their lives.127 These actions aim to preserve an idea
of justice and to give hope to a population that suffered and almost lost all hope that a judicial
system would ever hear its claims for help. Furthermore, the ruling is a message to future
generations that justice can be reached on domestic and international levels. Public apologies
or monuments have symbolic importance. They arguably convey the idea that if domestic
courts or policy makers are unable or unwilling to establish an effective system to protect
minority rights, the victims or alleged victims know that there is the possibility of recourse to
international law in order to finally have their claims heard.
This pro individual interpretation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is also
found in Article 29 of the American Convention and takes into account a teleological view of
human rights that is based on the current evolution of international law. However, the Court
does not define or detail what this “current evolution” means. The Inter-American Court’s
approach thus has deeper roots than Article 29. It is based on the whole inter-American human
rights system established by the American Declaration and Convention, which seek to bring
together natural law and legal positivism in a framework that recognizes the individual legal
personality in a pluralistic world. In other words, individuals are subjects of international law
beyond the traditional sense of possessing rights and duties on the international level.128
Human rights bodies of the Organization of American States must recognize that
individuals, who bear rights and duties on the international plane, are not identical but rather
have different historical, religious, philosophical and cultural backgrounds. Individuals have
the right to be acknowledged as different and as possessing their own views and particularities.
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11).

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

In acknowledging this system, the Inter-American Court furthers the paradigm of the human
rights instruments of the OAS itself and crystalizes the position that individuals are subjects of
international law endowed with diverse cultural backgrounds.
Cançado Trindade pointed out the special nature of human rights treaties, which do not
solely regulate state interests.129 Indeed, human rights treaties are sui generis, or with unique
characteristics, because they set erga omnes obligations to the whole international community
and not only to states. Consequently, human rights treaties cannot be developed, interpreted,
or applied without taking into consideration their special nature, which protects individuals by
accounting for their multicultural backgrounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
Different individuals with different cultural, ethnic, and philosophical backgrounds share the
same physical space. Some of these individuals are part of a state’s social or political majority
while others invariably fall in the minority. Multiculturalism, as part of a human rights idea,
acknowledges this diversity, and states must also recognize all individuals as bearers of a legal
personality, regardless of whether they belong – individually or collectively – to a social
majority or minority.
The universal system of international human rights law can accommodate this cultural,
ethnic, and religious diversity: human rights treaties can be interpreted taking into account the
diversity that is intrinsically part of the individual legal personality. There is thus no conflict
between the recognition of a multicultural society and the generally vague provisions of the
American Convention. As Cançado Trindade pointed out, “[a]ll cultures and religions are to
foster respect for others, are open to minimum universal standards of respectful behavior, and
to human solidarity, and acknowledge the human dignity of the human person.”130
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This plurality of cultures, which states need to acknowledge, impacts international
human rights law in two different ways. First, it reaffirms that individuals, who are subjects of
international law, possess particularities and cultural diversities. Second, international human
rights courts have to ensure that states are indeed accommodating the cultural and ethnic groups
within their territory.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based on the pro homine principle,
acknowledged this multicultural approach that requires states to uphold individuals’ cultural
particularities. Based on a legal hermeneutical tool, the Court accepted, at least to some extent,
the pluralistic concept of the individual legal personality, especially in the case of indigenous
peoples. Although the Inter-American Court avoids mentioning the specific terms of
“multiculturalism” or “pluralistic personality,” it acknowledged that indigenous peoples have
a different culture that states need to consider. The Court thus moved away from international
law’s solely liberal – focusing only on individual rights – or restrictive approaches – focusing
only on state consent– to treaty interpretation and application to extend the American
Convention’s framework of protection to cultural and ethnic minorities. This move represents
an acceptance of the individual legal personality within a new multicultural framework.
The Inter-American Court aims to accommodate different views within a framework of
protection that is increasingly human-centered. Liberal or individualistic approaches to human
rights, such as the “traditional” right to property, stand with equal weight as the communal or
collective right to property.131 The Court interprets the provisions of the American Convention
in the light of both the traditional or liberal understanding of rights enshrined in human rights
declarations and treaties and the collective, cultural, and sociological views of rights. These
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interpretations are focused on the human person as a subject of rights and duties, that is, as an
international actor different than states.

